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Abstract
We explore a model in which agents enter into a contract but are uncertain about
how a judge will enforce it. The judge can consider a wide range of evidence, or instead,
use a rule-based method of judgment that relies on limited information. We focus on
the following tradeo⁄: Considering a wide range of evidence increases the likelihood of
a correct ruling in the case at hand but undermines the formation of precedents that
resolve legal uncertainty for subsequent agents.
In a model of contractual innovation, we show that the use of evidence increases
the likelihood of innovation in any period, while rule-driven judgments increase the rate
of di⁄usion of the innovation. When courts can use a mixture of evidence and rules,
the minimum amount of evidence that induces adoption is (weakly) decreasing over
time. We also examine the breadth of precedents. Overlapping jurisdictions reduce the
optimal breadth of precedents because broad precedents are more likely to introduce
con￿ ict. Accordingly, overlapping jurisdictions increase the value of using evidence.
We use our model to interpret di⁄erences between the legal systems in the U.S. and
England.
￿The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily re￿ ect those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or of the Federal Reserve System. The authors thank Philip Bond, Ronel
Elul, Leonard Nakamura, and David Skeel for helpful discussions. The most recent version of this paper is
available at www.philadelphiafed.org/econ/wps/index.html.
11 Introduction
Courts play a crucial role in enforcing contractual agreements. We usually assume that
agents write the best contract for themselves and that courts enforce their agreement accu-
rately; and in routine transactions this may be a reasonable approximation. But in novel or
complicated contractual situations legal risk arises because the agents￿intentions must be
interpreted by the court or because the agreement raises broader legal or social issues. In
these cases, the courts play a central role in resolving legal risk; some recent examples in-
clude court decisions concerning ATM fees, the poison pill and other defensive mechanisms
against takeovers, and the enforcement of credit swaps in the event of sovereign defaults.1
While it is di¢ cult to quantify the overall e⁄ect of legal uncertainty on economic deci-
sion making, individual cases suggest that the e⁄ects can be large. For example, Kamma,
Weintrop, and Weir (1988) ￿nd evidence of signi￿cant investor losses associated with the
Delaware Supreme Court￿ s decision to uphold Unocol￿ s poison pill amendment; these losses
occurred to shareholders of other Delaware ￿rms that appeared to be targets of hostile
takeover attempts at the time. Kamma et al. interpret these losses as investors￿(negative)
valuation of the precedent established by the court￿ s ruling.
Legal systems di⁄er in their rules governing judicial interpretation, notably: (i) The
extent to which precedents are binding; and (ii) The range of evidence a court can (or must)
consider in resolving a contractual dispute.2 For example, it is widely held that judges view
precedents as more binding in England than in the U.S. (see, for example, Atiyah and
Summers, 1987). Eric Posner (1998) has argued that within the U.S. some states have
stricter rules limiting the admissibility of evidence outside the ￿four corners￿of the formal
contractual agreement. Our focus is on the ways in which the rules of interpretation a⁄ect
1The legal issues in these examples concerned whether the Comptroller of the Currency could preempt
state and local laws limiting ATM fees, whether defensive mechanisms that entrenched current management
were consistent with boards of directors￿￿duciary responsibilities, and the conditions in which the buyer of
a credit-default swap can make a claim for restitution against the seller of the swap.
2The term rules of interpretation should be interpreted broadly to include system-wide standards that are
not necessarily mandatory, in addition to mandatory standards enforced by precedents from higher courts.
2the resolution of legal uncertainty in common law legal systems, although our analysis may
be more broadly applicable.
We explore a theoretical model in which agents enter into a contract but are uncertain
about how a judge will interpret and enforce it in the event of dispute. The judge can use two
di⁄erent methods for resolving a dispute, which introduces our main trade-o⁄. On the one
hand, the judge may consider a wide range of evidence￿ for example, the agents￿discussions
leading up to the writing of a contract or the agents￿prior actions under the contractual
agreement before their dispute led them to court. Considering a wide range of evidence may
increase the likelihood that the judge makes a correct ruling in the case at hand, but the use
of evidence comes at a cost. Speci￿cally, using a wide array of evidence may undermine the
formation of precedents that resolve legal uncertainty for subsequent agents. Alternatively,
the judge can use a rule-based method of judgment that relies on a more limited information
set. This method is less likely to lead to a correct judgment in any one period but speeds the
dynamic resolution of legal uncertainty. We discuss the relationship between these di⁄erent
methods and the rules of interpretation under the Uniform Commercial Code.3
We examine some of the implications of this tradeo⁄ in a number of applications. In
a model of contractual innovation in which courts can either use evidence or rule-driven
judgments, we show that the use of evidence increases the likelihood of innovation in any
period, while rule-driven judgments increase the rate of di⁄usion of the innovation. We also
explore a model in which courts can use a mixture of evidence and rules. In this application
we show that the minimum amount of evidence that is necessary to induce agents to adopt
the innovation is (weakly) decreasing over time.
We also examine the breadth of precedents. If precedents were fully binding, our basic
3We consider a number of interpretations along the way. One interpretation emphasizes two judicial
approaches to contract interpretation in the common law tradition. The use of evidence corresponds to
the subjectivist approach, which seeks to uncover the contracting agents￿true intentions, while rule-based
judgment corresponds to the objectivist approach, which seeks to determine the intentions of reasonable
agents in comparable situations. See, for example, Chapter 7 of Farnsworth (1999). In another interpretation,
the use of evidence corresponds to a substantive orientation￿ in which judges seek substantive justice in the
case at hand￿ while the rule-based decision corresponds to a more formalist approach. Atiyah and Summers
(1987) use this distinction to contrast the U.S. and English legal systems. Note, we use the term formalism
without the pejorative connotation of Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003).
3tradeo⁄says that the broadest possible precedents would be more desirable because they re-
duce legal risk to the greatest possible extent. However, overlapping jurisdictions or multiple
sources of law￿ a characteristic of the US legal system, with its 50 state court systems and a
federal court system￿ create an o⁄setting cost for the use of broad precedents. A precedent
created in one location can undermine a precedent from another location, thereby increas-
ing rather than reducing legal uncertainty. Accordingly, overlapping jurisdictions increase
the value of using evidence. This ￿nding is broadly consistent with the observation that
precedents have less binding force in the U.S. than in England and also with the observation
that U.S. courts are typically less formalist than English courts.
Our main contribution is to provide a theoretical analysis of how di⁄erent legal systems
resolve legal risk, with special attention to the process of contractual innovation.4 Un-
derstanding the legal mechanisms for handling innovations should provide insights into the
relationship between the legal system and economic performance, a matter that has received
intensive study in the (mainly empirical) law and ￿nance literature in recent years.5
Related Literature
Apart from its general connections to the broader literature on law and ￿nance, our
paper is closely related to a number of works in the economics and legal literatures that
emphasize the e⁄ects of legal risk on contracting practices. In the economics literature,
Franks and Sussman (2005) examine the dynamics of contractual innovation in a world
with legal risk. In their model, legal risk leads to ine¢ cient contractual innovations because
agents know that judges are likely to make errors, and so write contracts that are only
optimal in light of the judge￿ s likely mistakes. These contracts then become ine¢ cient
standards for subsequent agents. In their model, legal risk can also lead to dynamic traps,
as agents avoid risky innovations to seek the certainty of standardized contracts. Gennaioli
4Although our focus is on common law systems like the U.S. and England, it may also apply to a broader
range of legal systems. For cross-country evidence on the use of precedent, see MacCormick and Summers
(1997). For a comparative discussion of judicial interpretation in di⁄erent legal systems, see Chapter 30 in
Zweigert and Kotz (1998).
5There is now a large literature relating legal systems to ￿nancial development and growth. The two
seminal works are La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997,1998). Djankov, et al. (2003)
explicitly consider the role of courts. Pistor et al. (2002) provide cross-national evidence concerning the rate
of legal innovation. Levine (forthcoming) contains a useful review of much of the literature.
4(2003) and Gennaioli and Shleifer (2005) both focus on the implications of legal risk arising
from judicial bias. Gennaioli (2003) shows that uncertainty about the judge￿ s bias can
lead agents to forgo optimally state-contingent contracts in favor of rigid contracts that
constrain judicial discretion. In a world where judges may either be biased or e¢ cient,
Gennaioli and Shleifer (2005) formally examine Richard Posner￿ s (2005, 6th ed.) conjecture
that precedents tend to evolve toward e¢ cient rules. Chatterji and Filipovich (2002) present
a model in which contractual ambiguity induces agents to write incomplete contracts as a
hedge against legal risk. None of these papers formally examine di⁄erent methods of judicial
interpretation as an element of the legal system or how interpretation a⁄ects the dynamic
resolution of legal risk.6
In the legal literature, Goetz and Scott (1985) argue that boilerplate contractual terms
are a potentially e¢ cient mechanism for overcoming legal risk and that formalist styles of
contractual interpretation can induce agents to bear the risks of introducing new language
into a contract, thereby reducing legal risk.7 The cost of contractual standardization is that
boilerplate language becomes stale. The ￿rst part of their argument has clear connections
to our work. However, for Goetz and Scott (1985) and in Scott￿ s subsequent work, the
court￿ s use of case-speci￿c evidence is an unmitigated bad, both because it induces sloppy
contracting (thereby reducing the production of useful boilerplate) and because it under-
mines contractual enforcement. In turn, the main tradeo⁄ in our paper￿ and the results
that follow￿ di⁄er from those in Goetz and Scott (1985). Eric Posner (1998) discusses how
legal risk and judicial methods of interpretation a⁄ect contract form. He shows that judges￿
willingness to consider a wide array of noncontractual evidence leads agents to write more
incomplete contracts.
There are also a few papers that discuss various aspects of judicial interpretation in the
absence of legal risk or dynamic considerations, the main elements of our model. Shavell
6Franks and Sussmann (2005) do contrast systems in which legislation is the primary mechanism for
innovation versus systems in which judicial rulings are the primary mechanism. They also have a discussion
of passive versus active judges in their account of the di⁄erent judicial approaches to the introduction of the
￿ oating charge in England and the U.S.
7This is an argument that Scott has followed up in a number of subsequent works pressing for a renewed
formalism in contract interpretation. See, for example, Scott (2000a, 2000b).
5(2003) presents optimal rules of interpretation for judges who are fully informed about the
agents￿intentions and the optimal contract when it is costly for agents to include explicit
contractual terms. Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2003a, 2003b) discuss conditions in
which it is optimal for an asymmetrically informed judge to override contractual terms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we illustrate the main tradeo⁄
through an example. In Section 3, we present the model. In Section 4, we compare two
systems: one in which judges rule based on facts that are common across agents, and one
in which judges rule based on idiosyncratic evidence. In Section 5, we apply this tradeo⁄
in a model of contractual innovation, and in Section 6, we allow for con￿ icting precedents
and examine the optimal breadth of a precedent. We conclude in Section 7.
2 An example
There are two states s1 and s2, and two projects. A pair of agents can select at most one
project. Each project yields two units of a consumption good. If the agents choose the ￿rst
project, the two units go to agent 1 in state s1 and to agent 2 in state s2. If they choose
the second project, the two units go to agent 2 in state s1 and to agent 1 in state s2.
The two agents can make sure that each agent ends up with one unit by entering a
bilateral contract that says that the agent with two units transfers one unit to the other
one; this may be the preferred outcome if agents are risk averse. The speci￿c contract
depends on the project chosen. If they choose the ￿rst project, they enter a contract that
says that agent 1 transfers one unit to agent 2 in state 1, and agent 2 transfers one unit in
state 2. Similarly, if they choose the second project, they enter a contract that says that
agent 2 transfers one unit in state 1, and agent 1 transfers in state 2. In addition to the
units from the project, each agent has one unit that can be seized; thus, the judge can
enforce a contract even if he cannot observe who has the two units.
There are two types of judges. The ￿rst enforces every contract as if it was the ￿rst
contract; the second enforces every contract as if it was the second. If the agents knew the
judge￿ s type, they could choose the appropriate project and contract and obtain the highest
6possible utility; for example, if they knew the judge is type 1, they could choose the ￿rst
project and enter the ￿rst contract.
Legal uncertainty stems from the fact that the agents do not know the judge￿ s type.
Ex-ante the judge is equally likely to be of either type. Therefore, no matter what project
and contract the agents choose, the judge rules incorrectly with probability 1/2. However,
after the judge rules in the ￿rst case, his type becomes known, and agents can adjust their
agreement (project plus contract) accordingly so that it is correctly enforced.
Now suppose that instead of making a ruling based on his type, the judge looks at
some evidence that indicates which project the agents selected; with probability 0.9, the
evidence is correct and points to the right project, and with probability 0.1, the evidence is
misleading and points to the wrong project. When the judge considers this type of evidence,
he is more likely to rule correctly in the speci￿c case. The downside is that agents cannot
learn his type and adjust their agreement. In other words, legal uncertainty is not reduced
for other pairs of agents who face the same choice problem.
3 The model
There is an in￿nite number of periods t = 1;2;:::. Each period has two stages. In the ￿rst
stage, a pair of agents selects a project p 2 P. In the second stage, a state s 2 S is realized
and the two agents go to court. The judge rules by selecting an outcome a 2 A. The agents
have a preferred outcome. If the judge chooses the preferred outcome, each agent obtains
a utility u; otherwise, each agent obtains v < u. In the ￿rst case, we say the judge rules
correctly; in the second case that he rules incorrectly. Formally, let ￿ : (p;s) ! A denote
the agents￿preferred outcome given p and s. The utility for each agent given p;s; and a is
U(p;s;a) =
￿
u if ￿(p;s) = a
v otherwise.
(1)
Why do agents go to court? The two agents agree on the preferred outcome in each state
when they choose the project, but they disagree at a later stage. Formally, there is a random
variable e " whose realization becomes known after s is realized; the random variable takes
7the values " and ￿" with equal probabilities. Agent￿ s 1 utility is
U1(p;s;a) =
￿
u if ￿(p;s) = a
v +e " otherwise,
(2)
and agent￿ s 2 utility is
U2(p;s;a) =
￿
u if ￿(p;s) = a
v ￿e " otherwise.
(3)
Assume v +" > u; then once the agents observe e ", one of them prefers that the judge rules
￿(p;s), while the other prefers that the judge rules di⁄erently.
The legal system. Denote by pt the project chosen by pair t, and by st the state realized
in period t: The judge rules according to some function ￿t(pt;st;￿). Agents do not know
what ￿t is; their beliefs regarding ￿t are given by Pr(￿t(p;s;￿) = ajIt); where It is the
public information available at the beginning of period t.
Agents￿problem. Denote by Pr(s) the probability that state s will be realized; assume
that each state is realized with a positive probability. The agents in period t choose p 2 P





Pr(s)Pr(￿t(p;s;￿) = ajIt)U(p;s;a). (4)
Denote the probability that the judge will rule correctly in state s by
mt(p;s) ￿ Pr(￿t(p;s;￿) = ￿(p;s)jIt), (5)
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8Denote p￿ = argmaxp2P bt(p) and b￿
t = bt(p￿).
For simplicity, we focus on the case where there are only two possible outcomes, each is





for every pair (p;s), and the choice of project in the ￿rst period does not matter; all projects
provide the same expected utility. In addition, b￿
0 = 1
2; a priori judges are equally likely to
choose the correct or the incorrect outcome.
4 Looking at evidence vs. creating precedents
In this section we compare two special legal systems: one in which the court decides based
on facts that are common across agents, and one in which the court decides based on facts
that are idiosyncratic to the case at hand. In the ￿rst system precedents are created; in the
second system they are not.
4.1 Creating precedents
The ￿rst legal system is as follows: There is a set of common elements F (with individual
element f) and a function h : S ! F that speci￿es a common element for every state; this
function de￿nes a partition of S. The judge in period t observes h(st) and rules according
to some function g : F ! A, as follows:
￿t(p;s;￿) = g(h(s)). (9)
One interpretation is that upon observing a single state (s) the judge draws out the
essential features that he believes to be important to the case at hand. These essential fea-
tures are what we call common elements. Crucially, common elements are comparable across
agents, who can read about the court￿ s judgment in the public record. Formally, the public
record contains the judge￿ s decision and the basis for the ruling, i.e., the facts he observed.
The judge makes no announcement about possible rulings in states he has not observed,
9as we discuss below. In the beginning of period t, the record is It = [h(st0);g(h(st0))]t￿1
t0=1,
where st0 denotes the state that was realized in period t0.
The judge does not observe pt and he does not observe ￿. If we think of ￿ as represent-
ing a contract between the two agents, we can interpret the fact that the judge does not
observe ￿ in two di⁄erent ways. In one interpretation, the contract is not clear about the
agents￿intentions and the judge must interpret the contract according to some standard,
for example, he can use the common law￿ s ￿reasonable person￿as a guide for construing the
agents￿contractual goals. Another possible interpretation is that the judge is not bound by
the agents￿intentions when he makes a ruling. In practice, this may happen if the judge has
a di⁄erent objective than enforcing the parties￿will; for example, he may take into account
third parties who are a⁄ected by the bilateral agreement.8
Agents know h, but they do not know g. They believe that g, which we refer to as the
judge￿ s type, is drawn from some set G = fg1;g2;:::;gng according to some probability
distribution Pr(gi); thus, Pr(g(f) = a) =
P
gi2G:gi(f)=a Pr(gi): This is one way of formal-
izing the view that the same evidence may be interpreted di⁄erently by di⁄erent judges,
depending on the legal principles the judge brings to bear on the case, or perhaps, depend-
ing on the judge￿ s personal prejudices. The assumption that agents know h, that is, that
all judges share a common view of the essential features of the case is for simplicity alone.
We could perform a similar analysis if di⁄erent judges classi￿ed states according to di⁄erent
conceptual schemes, that is, if we allowed them to use di⁄erent partitions.
Assume that for two common elements f 6= f0, knowing g(f) does not change the agents￿
8A recent court case provides an interesting example of legal uncertainty and the use of rules. Eternity
Global Master Fund, a hedge fund, had purchased a credit default swap from Morgan Guaranty Trust to
hedge Argentine bonds. When Argentina announced a ￿voluntary￿rescheduling of its debt, Eternity sought
to unwind its positions. Morgan refused claiming that Eternity had exchanged its bonds ￿voluntarily￿
and that the contract limited Morgan￿ s obligation to ￿mandatory￿exchanges. Eternity countered that the
exchange had been economically coercive and, therefore, e⁄ectively mandatory. The judge ￿rst ruled that
it was irrelevant whether the exchange was mandatory, but then reversed himself in a second decision.
The second opinion explicitly rejects consideration of the economic context of the exchange and refers to
the dictionary meaning of the word mandatory. Pointing to the dictionary meaning of a contract term
is common when judges use the plain meaning rule for interpreting disputed terms. See Eternity Global
Master Fund Limited, plainti⁄ against Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of N.Y. and JP Morgan Chase
Bank, Defendants, United States District Court for the Southern District of N.Y., Oct. 29, 2002, and June
5, 2003.
10priors regarding g(f0); that is, if f 6= f0,
Pr(g(f0) = a0jg(f) = a) = Pr(g(f0) = a0). (10)
It then follows that agents update their beliefs regarding court ruling as follows:




1 if h(s) = h(st) and g(h(st)) = a
0 if h(s) = h(st) and g(h(st)) 6= a
Pr(￿t(p;s;￿)) = ajIt) if h(s) 6= h(st)
(11)
This is our way of modeling precedents, which has two main features: (i) Seeing how the
judge rules when he has considered fact f resolves all uncertainty about how future courts
will rule when they face the same fact. (ii) However, observing the judge￿ s ruling for fact f
adds no information as to how he will rule if he considers a di⁄erent fact f0.
The ￿rst part follows from the assumption that all judges are constrained to use the
same function g (equation (9)). Alternatively, one can assume that each judge has his own
function gt, but judges must follow precedents. A binding precedent means that subsequent
judges must rule the same way for essentially similar cases. Here, if the judge rules based
on a fact that was used in a previous case, he must be consistent with the prior decision,
although each judge can rule according to his own interpretation of the law for facts that have
not been considered previously. The assumption that precedents are perfectly binding is a
polar case that captures one essential role of precedent, the resolution of legal uncertainty.
We relax this assumption later in the paper.9
The second part, that a court￿ s ruling for a given fact is completely uninformative
about the way courts will rule when they observe a di⁄erent fact, is mainly a technical
simpli￿cation; this is another polar case. However, the underlying idea, that agents do not
update their beliefs about future judgments in situations far removed from the case at hand
can be interpreted as representing the common law view that judgments must be rooted
9For those readers who do not believe that precedents actually have binding force, consider the following
quote from Summers, in his chapter on precedent in the United States, speci￿cally N.Y. State: ￿The tendency
of courts to follow precedents in contract, torts, and property is so pronounced that N.Y. appellate courts
routinely remark that, although they may not agree with an established precedent, they nonetheless felt
constrained to follow it.￿(MacCormick and Summers, 1997, p. 372). Most scholars note that the binding
force of precedent is quite powerful in commercial law, although it is less powerful in statute law and in
constitutional law.
11in the facts of the particular case at hand. According to this view, it is inappropriate for
judges to speculate about how they would judge were the facts signi￿cantly di⁄erent.10
Costless adjustment. We assume that agents can adjust their project costlessly so that
its ideal outcome is consistent with prior rulings. This allows us to focus on one aspect of
the role of precedent in isolation, the resolution of legal uncertainty. E⁄ectively, we assume
that as long as agents can predict a judge￿ s ruling in a particular state, they can adjust
their contract to achieve their desired ends; thus, there are no good or bad precedents.11
We recognize that precedents may also ine¢ ciently constrain agents￿contractual choices,
but we abstract from these issues in the present paper
More formally, we assume that
Assumption 1 For every vector of outcomes (as)s2S, there exists a unique project p 2 P,
such that ￿(p;s) = as for every s 2 S.
Then the solution to the agents￿problem is as follows: Consider the agents in period t.
Suppose the states s1;s2;:::st￿1 were realized in the previous periods, and let
S0
t = fs 2 S : there exists t0 < t;such that h(s) = h(st0)g. (12)
The set S0
t includes the states for which a precedent was created before period t. Given
equations (8) and (11), it follows that mt(p;s) = 1=2 for every pair (p;s) such that s = 2 S0
t;
in these states the choice of project does not matter. However, Assumption 1 implies that
there exists a project p 2 P whose ideal outcome is consistent with the judge￿ s rulings in
the other states s 2 S0














Pr(s) ￿ 1: (13)
10Note that we abstract from the hierarchical dimension of precedent, i.e., that lower courts are formally
bound by the decisions of higher courts. This would be important in a model that focuses either on the
enforceability of precedents or the process of correcting mistaken or obsolete precedents, interesting issues
that we do not address.
11Eternity v. Morgan provides a concrete illustration of our costless adjustment assumption. Assume that
the best outcome for two ￿rms is that a coercive exchange be treated as an involuntary exchanges. In light
of the judge￿ s ruling, we e⁄ectively assume that future agents can direct the judge to consider the economic




t Pr(s); this expression represents the amount of legal uncertainty resolved
up to period t. It then follows that
b￿
t = ￿t +
1
2
(1 ￿ ￿t): (14)
Since S0
t+1 ￿ S0
t, it follows that ￿t+1 ￿ ￿t. Note that ￿1 = 0. In addition, since every state
is realized with a positive probability, limt!1 ￿t = 1; eventually, every state is realized at
least once and all uncertainty is resolved. It follows that b￿
1 = 1
2, b￿
t increases in t, and
limt!1 b￿
t = 1. This is true for every realization of fst0g1
t0=1:
The breadth of precedents. A precedent is broader if it applies to more cases. Formally,





Di⁄erent functions h induce di⁄erent breadths; in particular, if h1 de￿nes a broader partition
of S than h2, then h1 induces broader precedents. It follows from equation (12) that if h1
induces broader precedents than h2, then ￿t(h1) ￿ ￿t(h2) with a strict inequality for some
t; thus, broad precedents reduce uncertainty faster. In Section 6 we extend the model to
allow for con￿ icting precedents and show that broad precedents no longer imply a faster
resolution of uncertainty.
4.2 Looking at evidence
The second legal system is as follows: The judge in period t observes a piece of evidence e et
which is a random variable:
e et (pt;st) =
￿
￿(pt;st) with probability m
a 6= ￿(pt;st) with probability 1 ￿ m.
(16)
In other words, with probability m < 1, the judge observes the agents￿preferred outcome
and with probability 1 ￿ m, he observes a di⁄erent outcome. The judge rules according to
￿t(p;s;￿) = e et(p;s). (17)
If we interpret ￿ as a contract, then evidence refers to a range of interactions that may
be highly informative about the agents￿true intentions but lie outside the contract proper.
13This piece of evidence can represent, for example, evidence on pre-contractual negotiations,
interactions between the agents under prior contractual agreements, oral communications,
etc.12 It is assumed that m > 1
2; therefore, using evidence is better than using a rule if the
goal is to determine the agents￿intentions. The rationale for this assumption is that the
judge bases his decision on more information. In our model, the use of evidence would be
strictly dominated if this were not true. (See Scott (2000a, 2000b) for the alternative view
that a judge considering such evidence is likely to misread the agents￿intentions.)
The record contains the evidence and the ruling. It is assumed that e et are iid; thus, a
ruling in one case does not provide any information regarding rulings in other cases.
We obtain mt(p;s) = m for every pair (p;s). In addition, b￿
t = m for every t; thus, legal
uncertainty is not reduced through time.
4.3 Interpretation
Our two stylized legal systems have connections to real world legal systems. For example,
Atiyah and Summers (1987) have drawn the distinction between the formalist approach of
the English legal system and the substantive approach of the U.S. legal system. They argue
that English judges are more likely to read contracts literally and narrowly, a particular type
of rule, while U.S. judges are more likely to consider a broad range of evidence, including
noncontractual evidence, so as to achieve a ￿just￿ outcome. Indeed, confronted with a
contract that is not clear about the agents￿intentions, the Uniform Commercial Code, which
has been adopted in part or in whole in all ￿fty United States, directs the judge to consider:
(i) interactions between agents under the existing contract (the course of performance)￿
which may vary substantially from the explicit contractual terms; (ii) interactions between
the agents under agreements prior to the current one (the course of dealing); and (iii)
common business practices (usage of trade).13
A second connection relates to the historical development of U.S. legal interpretation
12Note that it is assumed here that the only way agents a⁄ect the realization of this random variable is
through their choice of project. Thus, we do not analyze the interesting possibility that the availability of
evidence may be a contracting choice.
13Under English law, course of performance is not accepted as evidence of contracting agents￿intentions
(Farnsworth, p. 490).
14in the twentieth century. The ￿rst Restatement of Contracts, an in￿ uential codi￿cation
of legal thinking about contracts, re￿ ects the objectivist view of contract interpretation,
in which contractual ambiguity leads the judge to inquire what a reasonable person in a
similar situation to the contracting agents would have understood the contract to mean.
This need not correspond to the understanding of the contracting agents themselves. The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts is a later codi￿cation that adopts the subjectivist view
that the primary role of the court is to determine the true intentions of the contracting
agents. In practice, the two codi￿cations adopt very di⁄erent approaches to the admissibility
of parol evidence, evidence of negotiations prior to the ￿nal contract, with the Restatement
Second adopting a much more liberal approach in its willingness to consider such evidence.
According to the most authoritative current treatise on contracts, Farnsworth￿ s Contracts
(3rd edition, 1999), the more liberal approach to the use of parol evidence of the Restatement
Second has increasingly gained the upper hand among jurists. In our model, this would
represent a movement from a more rule-oriented system to a more evidence-oriented system
in the latter half of the twentieth century.14
4.4 The tradeo⁄
Suppose we want to maximize a weighted sum of the agents￿utilities across all periods.
This is the same as maximizing E
P1
t=0 wtb￿
t, where the expectation is with respect to the
information before period 1 begins, when we do not know the sequence of states that will be
realized. The next proposition implies that if we put a lot of weight on the ￿rst periods, the
evidence system is preferred; otherwise, the rule-driven system is preferred. In addition, the
rule-based system becomes more attractive when precedents are broad. Formally, assume
that the breadth of every precedent created is ￿ 2 (0;1), that is ￿(s) = ￿ for every s 2 S.
Then:
Proposition 1 (i) Under the rule-driven system E(b￿
t) = 1 ￿ 1
2(1 ￿ ￿)t￿1, and under the
14In one sense, the objectivist/subjectivist distinction is a special case of the formalist/substantive dis-
tinction. Katz (2004) de￿nes the degree of formalism by the extent to which courts rule on the basis of a
less information.
15evidence system E(b￿
t) = m. (ii) When t > 1, the di⁄erence 1 ￿ 1
2(1 ￿ ￿)t￿1 ￿ m is strictly
increasing in t as well as in ￿; the di⁄erence is negative when t = 1 and positive when t is
large enough.
Proof: (i) Consider the rule-driven system. Given that precedents were created for a
portion ￿t of the states, then in the next period with probability ￿t no new precedent is
created, and with probability 1 ￿ ￿t, a new precedent of breadth ￿ is created. Thus,
￿t+1j￿t =
￿
￿t with probability ￿t
￿t + ￿ with probability 1 ￿ ￿t.
(18)
It follows that
E(￿t+1j￿t) = ￿t￿t + (1 ￿ ￿t)(￿t + ￿) (19)
= ￿t + ￿(1 ￿ ￿t),
and
E(￿t+1) = E(E(￿t+1j￿t)) = E(￿t) + ￿(1 ￿ E(￿t)) (20)
= ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)E(￿t):
Using the formula for the sum of a geometric series and the fact that E(￿1) = 0, it follows
that
E(￿t) = ￿
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)t￿1
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
(21)
= 1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)t￿1.
Using equations (14) and (21), it follows that under the rule-based system
E(b￿
t) = E(￿t) +
1
2



















The second part of (i) is immediate.
16(ii) Since ￿ 2 (0;1) and t > 1, it follows that the di⁄erence 1￿ 1
2(1￿￿)t￿1￿m is strictly
increasing in t and in ￿. When t = 1, we obtain that the di⁄erence equals 1
2 ￿ m < 0, and






(1 ￿ ￿)t￿1 ￿ m] = 1 ￿ m > 0: (23)
Q.E.D.
5 An application: The speed of innovation.
Suppose that in addition to the projects in P, there is another project the agent can
choose; denote this benchmark project by p0. We refer to the projects in P as the new type
of projects, and to p0 as the old type. While using the new type of project involves legal
uncertainty, using the old type of project does not. In particular, if a pair t chooses p0, they
obtain a utility v0
t that does not depend on the state or the judge￿ s ruling; in this case they
do not go to court.
It is optimal for pair t to adopt the new type of project if the judge is su¢ ciently likely
to choose their preferred outcome, that is,




t are iid according to some distribution function with continuous support
[v;v]. Assume that u > v; thus without legal uncertainty, all agents adopt the new type of
project. In addition, v < v+(u￿v)1
2 < v; thus with no prior resolution of legal uncertainty,
those with a low reservation utility adopt, while those with high reservation utility do not.
Legal uncertainty is reduced only if a case is brought to court, that is if a pair adopts
the new type of project, and then only if the court creates a precedent.
Denote by Ti the time it takes until a new pair adopts the new type of project given
that i pairs have already adopted, and let E(￿) denote the expectations operator. We use
the letter ￿R￿ to denote the rule-based system and ￿E￿ to denote the evidence system.
The following proposition states that a rule-driven legal system yields a quicker speed of
17adoption (than does a system that uses evidence) only after some point in time; before this
happens, a system that uses evidence induces faster adoption.
Proposition 2 (i) E(TE
1 ) < E(TR
1 ). (ii) There exists ￿ > 1, such that E(TE
i ) > E(TR
i ) if
and only if i ￿ ￿.
Proof. Denote by bi the probability of a correct judgment given that i pairs have already
adopted the new type of project, and denote by Hi the probability that a pair will adopt
the new type of project given that i pairs have already adopted. Then Hi ￿ Pr(v0
t <
v + (u ￿ v)bi) and E(Ti) = 1=Hi. In the rule-driven system, bR
1 = 1
2, bR
i is increasing in i,
and limi!1 bR
i = 1. In the evidence system, bE
i = m > 1=2. Therefore, there exists ￿ > 1,
such that bR
i > bE
i if and only if i ￿ ￿. The result then follows because Hi is increasing in
bi. Q.E.D.
Intuitively, in a rule-driven legal system, each court￿ s decision adds to the body of case
law and reduces uncertainty for subsequent entrants. Once a su¢ cient number of cases
have appeared before a judge, subsequent entry can become quite rapid because residual
legal uncertainty is low. In a system that uses evidence, there is no such time dependence
because each case is decided on its individual merits.
5.1 A mixed system
A special case of the analysis above is when v > v+(u￿v)1
2. In this case, in the rule-driven
system, we obtain that in the proof of Proposition 2, H0 = 0, and the innovation process
does not start at all. Suppose now that the judge in each period can use a mixture of
evidence and precedents. We can then ask: What is the minimum probability of looking
at evidence that is necessary to get the innovation process started, that is, to induce some
agents to adopt the new type of project?
In more detail, consider a third legal system that is a combination of the ￿rst two. In
each period, the judge observes two facts: h(st) and e et(pt;st). He then chooses one fact as
the basis for his ruling. With probability q, he chooses e et(pt;st), and with probability 1￿q,
he chooses h(st). If he chooses h(st), he rules according to the function g; otherwise, he
18rules e et. Then
￿t(p;s;￿) =
￿
h(g(s)) with probability 1 ￿ q
e et(p;s) with probability q.
(25)
The probability q is a choice variable determined by the designer of the legal system. The
record contains the two facts observed, the fact chosen, and the ruling. In our formulation,
it does not matter if the record contains the two facts, or just one because: (i) if the judge
rules based on e et, agents learn nothing about g even if h(st) is in the record; and (ii) if the
judge rules based on h(st), agents learn g(h(st)) even if e et is in the record.
A key assumption is that the judge cannot adopt the best of both methods of inter-
pretation. He cannot rule in the case at hand based on the idiosyncratic evidence, while
creating a precedent that holds for subsequent cases. If it was possible to rule on the basis
of evidence and also to announce a hypothetical ruling based on a common element, the
judge would both increase the probability of a correct judgment in the current case and
reduce uncertainty for all subsequent agents, clearly a ￿rst best.
In practice, the ￿rst best is often infeasible. Making a general ruling to create a prece-
dent while making an exception for the case at hand based on special considerations creates
problems. The most fundamental problem is that this contradicts the legal principle that
similar cases should be treated the same, a principle that underlies the rationale for binding
precedents.15 A judge￿ s ￿nding that certain facts are truly essential is undermined if he
makes an exception for the case at hand. Another problem is signal extraction; subsequent
agents have a harder time disentangling the logic of the judge￿ s opinion and, thus, have a
harder time determining what precedent has actually been set. A third problem is legiti-
macy. The judge￿ s willingness to actually rule on the basis of his own reasoning provides
agents with greater assurance that the judge hasn￿ t ruled arbitrarily or corruptly.16 In light
of these reasons, we examine legal systems that are second best.17
15According to Eisenberg (1988): ￿[A] court should reason by articulating and applying rules that it is
ready to apply in the future to all persons who are situated like the disputants.￿(p. 9)
16According to Eisenberg (1988): ￿Retroactivity also serves to ensure that the rule a court announces is
su¢ ciently well considered that the court is willing to apply the rule to individuals who stand before it.￿(p.
127)
17 Judges sometimes engage in a practice called prospective overruling; they decide the case at hand on
the basis of an existing precedent but announce a new precedent to be used for subsequent cases. Judges use
19The next proposition shows that once more uncertainty has been resolved, it is less
necessary to look at evidence. Thus, the minimum probability necessary is decreasing
through time.
Consistent with previous notation, suppose uncertainty was resolved for the states in S0
and denote ￿ =
P
s2S0 Pr(s). Denote by qmin(￿) the minimum probability needed to have
the innovation process continue.
Proposition 3 If ￿1 < ￿2, then either qmin(￿1) = qmin(￿2) = 0 or qmin(￿1) > qmin(￿2).
Proof: Denote H(b) ￿ Pr(v0
t ￿ v+(u￿v)b); this is the probability that a pair will adopt
the new type of projects if they believe that the judge will rule correctly with probability
b: With probability ￿, the agents observe s 2 S0; so they do not face legal uncertainty.
Otherwise, if evidence is used (probability q), the judge rules correctly with probability m,
and if evidence is not used (probability 1 ￿ q), the judge rules correctly with probability
1=2. Denote
d(q) = mq +
1
2
(1 ￿ q): (26)
The ex-ante probability of ruling right is b = ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)d(q). The innovation process
continues if and only if H(b) > 0. This happens if and only if v + (u ￿ v)b ￿ v, which is
equivalent to b ￿ b, where b ￿ v￿v
u￿v. Note that b ￿ b is equivalent to ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)d(q) > b,





Since d(0) = 1
2, it follows that if
b￿￿
1￿￿ < 1
2, then qmin(￿) = 0; in this case agents innovate
even if evidence is not used. Otherwise, qmin(￿) solves d(q) =
b￿￿






Since b < 1, it follows that when ￿ is higher, qmin(￿) is lower. Q.E.D.
this practice when they view the existing precedent as wrong but recognize that agents have made signi￿cant
investments believing that the existing precedent was binding. On the one hand, this is quite di⁄erent from
announcing the essential facts of a case and then ruling on the basis of a di⁄erent set of facts. That said,
legal scholars have argued that prospective overruling creates tensions for precisely the reasons we discuss.
See Eisenberg (1988), Chapter 7, and Atiyah and Summers (1987), Chapter 5.
206 Con￿ icting precedents
We now extend the model to allow for two locations. This permits us to examine the optimal
breadth of precedents. In a single location model, precedents always resolve uncertainty and
broader precedents resolve more uncertainty. However, in a model with multiple locations
(or jurisdictions) broader precedents may lead to con￿ icts.
The idea of multiple locations can be interpreted in two di⁄erent ways. The ￿rst is
literal. In the United States, there are 50 state court systems, as well as the federal court
system. And within individual state systems there are often multiple departments; for
example, there are four administrative departments in N.Y. State. Thus, the resolution of
a case often raises issues of con￿ icting precedents from di⁄erent jurisdictions. A second
interpretation is that di⁄erent lines of precedents may develop in two series of cases, whose
similarities are not initially recognized. At some point, a clever lawyer will recognize the
relevance of another line of precedent because it bene￿ts his client in a dispute.
Judges in each location tend to follow precedents from their own location; however,
there is a positive probability that a judge will rule based on a precedent created in the
other location. Thus, ￿t depends on the record created in each location.
We study a two-period model and focus on judges in a pure rule-based system. In the
￿rst period, there is a di⁄erent pair in each location, and judges in location i rule based
on gi and hi. Consider now the second period, and focus (without loss of generality) on
location 1. Denote by S0
i the set of states for which a precedent was created in location i
in the ￿rst period. (Here, the subscript refers to a location; in the previous sections the
subscript t referred to a period.) We assume that in the second period the judge in location
1 rules according to
￿(p;s) =
￿
g1(h1(s)) if s = 2 S0
2





1 with probability ￿
0 with probability 1 ￿ ￿:
(30)
21If the other location (location 2) created a precedent for the case in hand, there is a prob-
ability ￿ that location 1 will adopt the other precedent. Otherwise, the court in location 1
follows its own precedents or if there is none, it creates a new one. Assume for simplicity
that if both locations create a precedent for the same case, then the precedents contradict
one another; that is, g1(s) 6= g2(s) for every s. These assumptions above can be relaxed.
In particular, our results are not sensitive to the details of how con￿ icting precedents are
resolved, as long as there is some probability that the local precedent will not be followed.18
For simplicity, we focus on a particular speci￿cation of the information available to the
contracting agents: When agents choose their project, they know the record created in their
location, but not in the other location; therefore, they can adjust their project only to the




1 Pr(s) and ￿0 =
P
s2S0
2 Pr(s); the breadth of the precedent created
in location 1 is ￿, and the breath of the precedent in location 2 is ￿0. Assume that agents
know the functions hi, so they know ￿ and ￿0. Let bi denote the probability of a correct
ruling for the second pair in location i. Then
b1 = ￿ +
1
2
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿￿￿0. (31)
The ￿rst two terms are the same as in the single location case. The last term represents the
case in which the judge rules based on a precedent from the other location. This happens
when the state that is realized in period 2 belongs to S0
1 \ S0
2 and e ￿ = 1. In this case
the resolution of uncertainty is zero instead of one because agents adjusted their project
to g1 but not to g2. The overall e⁄ect is 1 ￿ Pr(e ￿ = 1) ￿ Pr(s 2 S0
1 \ S0
2) = ￿￿￿0: Note
that equation (31) assumes that the agents adjust their project according to the precedent
created in their own location. Alternatively, the agents could choose a project at random
and obtain b1 = 1
2. The ￿rst choice is preferred when ￿+ 1
2(1￿￿)￿￿￿￿0 > 1
2. Since ￿ > 0,
18It is important that agents cannot instruct the court to use the precedent of their preferred jurisdiction.
While real-world agents do include such clauses in contracts, these clauses are imperfectly enforceable. If we
interpret the locations as states, another state￿ s court may (successfully) claim that its own interests in the
case override the interests of the state cited in the agents￿contract. See Siegal and Borchers (2005). If we
interpret the con￿ ict as one in which two di⁄erent areas of law are merged, agents will typically be unable
to write enforceable clauses to avoid such novel legal developments.
22this is equivalent to ￿￿0 < 1
2.
Using equations similar to (29) and (31), we obtain that the probability of a correct
ruling in location 2 is
b2 = ￿0 +
1
2
(1 ￿ ￿0) ￿ ￿￿0￿: (32)
6.1 Optimal breadth
We solve for the breadth that leads to the maximal reduction in legal uncertainty in both
locations. The objective function is to choose ￿ and ￿0 that maximize b1 + b2. It follows
from (31) and (32) that
b1 + b2 = 1 +
1
2
(￿ + ￿0) ￿ 2￿￿0￿ (33)
Di⁄erentiating with respect to ￿, we obtain
1
2
￿ 2￿￿0 = 0, (34)
and di⁄erentiating with respect to ￿0; we obtain
1
2
￿ 2￿￿ = 0.
The optimal solution is




(Note that the condition ￿￿0 < 1
2 that assures that adjusting the project to the precedent
in one￿ s location is satis￿ed.) As one may expect, broad precedents are more useful when ￿
is low, that is, when the likelihood of con￿ ict is low.
6.2 Interpretation
We showed that when there is a large chance of con￿ ict it is better to create narrower
precedents; thus, the advantage of using rules versus using evidence is reduced. This suggests
a connection between multiple jurisdictions, the extent to which precedents are binding, and
the use of evidence. Our model is consistent with Atiyah and Summers￿ (1987) observation
that precedents are less binding in the U.S. than in England, a fact they ascribe (partly)
23to the greater number of overlapping jurisdictions and, thus, the greater prevalence of
con￿ icting precedents in the U.S. Our results also suggest one reason why U.S. courts may
adopt a less formalist approach than do English courts. Precedents that are more likely to
generate con￿ icts are less able to resolve legal uncertainty. In turn, we expect U.S. courts
to use evidence more often.
This interpretation is less consistent with another of Atiyah and Summers￿(1987) ob-
servations that in England precedents tend to be more narrowly drawn than precedents in
the U.S. According to our simple model, the possibility of con￿ ict would induce U.S. courts
not only to use evidence more often but also to draw relatively narrow precedents. We are
currently working on an extension of the model that may resolve this issue and bring our
theoretical model closer to the empirical evidence.
7 Conclusion
Considering a wide range of evidence may increase the likelihood that the judge makes a
correct ruling in the case at hand but it undermines the formation of precedents that resolve
legal uncertainty for subsequent agents. In a model of contractual innovation, this tradeo⁄
implies that the use of evidence increases the likelihood of innovation in any period, while
rule-driven judgments increase the rate of di⁄usion of the innovation. When courts can
use a mixture of evidence and rules, the minimum amount of evidence that is necessary to
induce agents to adopt the innovation is (weakly) decreasing over time. If precedents are
fully binding, our tradeo⁄ says that the broadest possible precedents are more desirable.
But if there are overlapping jurisdictions or multiple sources of law, the optimal breadth of
precedents is reduced because broad precedents are more likely to con￿ ict with one another.
Accordingly, overlapping jurisdictions increase the value of using evidence.
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